8 July 1944.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT OF MISSION

This report covers the operations of the Naval Section, Bar Harbor, Maine, Commander Alex W. Moffat, USNR Section Commander during the period of July 021520Q to July 071200Q.

TASK ASSIGNED:

- 1. Search for possible enemy submarine in area 44-06'N, 67-57'W, estimated course 340 T, sighted July 021045Q by fishermen Ernest Stanley and Merrill Stanley.
- Search for U.S. Navy Blimp K-14, rescue of survivors, and salvage operations of blimp bag and car. The K-14 out of South Weymouth, Massachusetts crashed in the water at approximately 2210Q, July 2 at 44-05'N, 67-50'W.

AREA OF TASK:

Southwest Harbor, Mt. Desert Rock, east to 67-30'W, to Southeast Rock off Petit Manan.

ESTIMATED DEPTH OF WATER IN AREA:

At location of submarine sighting - 228 feet.

At location of blimp crash - 300 feet.

TACTICS:

Upon receiving the report from the fishermen at 1505Q, July 2, a tactical plan was devised based on the protection of the Naval Radio Station at Schoodic Point. The PYc-47 as ComSur and the YP-600 were to search the area of sighting. The Army Crash Boat, P-103, was stationed at Pond Island off Schoodic Point as an observation vessel and to prevent any possible landings. The APc-94, which was visiting at Bar Harbor, was given an observation patrol between Schoodic Point Whistle to Petit Manan Island as she was the only ship in the area equipped with radar although she did not have listening gear or ASW equipment.

COMMUNICATIONS:

Excellent.

Operational Intelligence Report of Mission (Continued)

PERSONNEL:

Excellent.

COMMENTS:

July 2, 1944 (All times Queen)

At 1520, received report from Coast Guard Station at Southwest Harbor that Ernest Stanley and Merrill Stanley on the "Frolic" out of Southwest Harbor saw at approximately 1045 what they thought was a periscope, describing it as a pipe approximately four inches in diameter traveling at an estimated speed of 12 knots, at a distance of 300 yards from their boat at a position 13 miles southeast by south from Baker Island on a heading toward Egg Rock, located at the entrance of Frenchman Bay. The periscope disappeared soon after they had sighted it in the path of the sun. They could observe what they described as a hull 60 to 90 feet long and approximately 20 feet under water, making a straight wake approximately 25 to 35 feet wide with patches of oil. They observed the wake for one-half hour. Visibility was excellent, sea very calm, and there was practically no wind.

Ernest Stanley, owner of the "Frolic" has been fishing in the area for about 30 years. Merrill Stanley has been employed as an engineer aboard coastal freighters and stated that he has seen many submarines in and out of the water. Both men are considered very

reliable.

The Bar Harbor Section was immediately placed on an alert basis. The PYc-47 was ordered to conduct box search of area as ComSur with the YP-600 operating under his instructions. Rockland Section was notified of the sighting and was requested to assist. Army Crash Boat PlO3 was ordered to be stationed at Pond Island off Schoodic Point to observe and prevent any possible landing attempts. The APc-94 was given a patrol from Schoodic Island Whistle Buoy to Petit Manan because she had no ASW equipment with her and it was deemed advisable to use her as an observation vessel and utilize her radar as none of the Bar Harbor Section vessels are so equipped.

The Air Controller notified us that the blimp K-14 was going to be despatched to assist in the search and gave an ETA of 2000. (Actual time of arrival 2115.) The K-14 was to search an area from Matinicus Rock to Mt. Desert Rock, then the area 25 miles southeast of line until July 030600 and then return to base at South Weymouth.

At approximately 0235, July 3, the Air Controller at Boston called requesting us to ask SOPA or ComSur to contact the K-14 to determine whether or not the K-14 was still on station. The K-14 should have given an hourly report, but had not done so and South Weymouth was inquiring if radio was working. All ships on search were alerted and asked to report the presence of blimp if sighted.

Operational Intelligence Report of Mission (Continued)

A message was received at Bar Harbor Section Base from the PYc-47 at 0445, July 3, "Blimp crashed. Floating about 44-05'N, 67-50'W. Four survivors." A later message received at 0537 indicated that the survivors were bruised and suffering from exposure, but the PYc-47

had a pharmacist's mate aboard to give first aid.

The YP-600 was at the scene with the PYc-47 and orders were given to the P-103 and the APc-94 to proceed to the scene immediately to search for possible additional survivors. Planes out of Brunswick were ordered to search the area and at 0710, July 3, Lieutenant Ludwig, Lead Pilot, notified the Bar Harbor Section Base that the nose and bag of the blimp had been secured to the PYc-47 and that he had searched in area of from 5 to 10 miles and could see no additional survivors.

The Section Base was notified that salvage vessels were ordered to the scene as well as two DEs and the HARRIET LANE. (DE171 and 173.) The P-103 arrived at Bar Harbor at 0937 with the following survivors: Ensign McDonnell, Pilot; Ensign Levine, Co-Pilot; Ensign Sharp, Co-Pilot; Johnson, AMM2c. The survivors were immediately interviewed by Lieut. Comdr. John F. Pear, USNR. (See Appendix E for statements of survivors.)

At 0740, the PYc-47 recovered the body of Drezewicki, rigger. At 1304, the P-103 stood out of Bar Harbor for the scene of action with Lieut. Comdr. John F. Pear, USNR, of South Weymouth, Mass. aboard to relieve Lieutenant D.F. Carswell, USNR (PYc-47) as ComSur. At 1440, P-103 arrived on station and found the following ships present: DE 171 and DE 173, PYc-47, YP-600, APc-94, CG40003, CG66002, YP-457, CG38023.

Cranberry Island Coast Guard boats and Blimps K-25 and K-34.

Immediately upon arrival of Lieut. Comdr. Pear, he relieved Lieutenant Carswell as ComSur. Lieutenant (jg) Jameson and two divers with diving equipment were transferred to the YP-600 which was to be used as service ship to the divers and given instruction to stand by. Instructions were given to all small craft to stand off at least a half a mile from the wreckage. The CG66002, CG40003, and the Coast Guard lifeboats were ordered to stand by the P-103 to act as messenger vessels. All ships were notified that ComSur was aboard the P-103 and all radio and visual messages would be received by him and relayed to the Bar Harbor Section Base. All small vessels not considered required were ordered to secure from the scene.

The two DEs and the blimps were requested to take up a protective patrol covering a radius of 5 miles and search for additional bodies.

(See Appendix F.) *

A conference was held with the captains of each salvage vessel to determine what equipment was available for salvage operations. Unfortunately, no vessel other than the P-103 had flotation gear, adequate lighting facilities, or any additional equipment to attempt salvage at the scene of the wreck. The divers indicated that they could not operate successfully due to depth of the water and the dangerous condition of the bag. During the early evening an attempt was made to obtain a

^{*} Not included in War Diary.

Operational Intelligence Report of Mission (Continued)

secure purchase on the car frame, but it was soon found that no one

point was of sufficient strength to withstand the strain.

ComSur, after consultation with salvage officers, ordered the ATA 713 to take the wreckage in tow and proceed at slow speed toward Great Duck Island at 2156. Every precaution was taken to search the area for confidential material, additional wreckage, or bodies. The KICKAPOO was ordered to be lead vessel to pilot convoy to Baker Island. The HAIGLAR (YTB327) was given a position on the port hand of wreckage, YP-600 was given a position on the starboard hand while the GUMTREE trailed at a quarter-mile distance off the stern. The CG66002 and the Cranberry Island Lifeboats were ordered to make a criss-cross search at the stern of the convoy to search for bodies or additional wreckage.

July 4, 1944

The two DEs and the HARRIET LANE were ordered to maintain an

ASW coverage on a two and one-half mile radius of coverage.

At 0500, the DEs were granted permission to secure and the HARRIET LANE continued to screen the patrol. At 0745, a conference was called by ComSur consisting of the following officers: Lieutenant Belton, USCG (KICKAPOO); CBM Lombard, USNR (YTB 327); Lieut. (jg) W. F. Moore, USNR (ATA173); Lieut. Waugh, USNR (GUMTREE); Ensign W. O. Robinson, USNR (YP600); and Lieut. (jg) P. B. Jameson, USNR, officer in charge of the divers; Lieutenant R.F. Ward, USN, and Lieut. (jg) D. F. Patzig, USNR, construction experts from Lakehurst Blimp Headquarters.

It was estimated that the depth of wreck was 50 feet and it was agreed to beach out the wreckage on the north side of Little Cranberry Island. Captain Belton of the KICKAPOO was to go aboard the ATA173, the tow ship, and act as pilot. The HARRIET LANE was to continue her patrol and clear the approaches of all small craft while the tug YTB 327 was to follow astern. Bunker Neck Cove was chosen due to the small number of people on the island. The beach was considered satisfactory and afforded the greatest amount of security. It was decided not to beach on Mt. Desert Island due to the fact that the wreckage would attract an unnecessary number of people and no doubt the nearby residents of large estates would protest the placing of the wreckage on a bathing beach and the depth of water approaching Little Cranberry Island was shown by soundings to warrant the successful beaching of the wreckage. It was then determined that it was practically impossible to salvage the wreckage with available equipment, but it was planned to search the car of the wreckage and remove all bodies found and await further orders from Elimp Headquarters.

At 0940, convoy arrived at Bunker Cove. The CG66002 was ordered to clear all small vessels out of the cove and notify all lobstermen to pull their traps. Coast Guard station at Southwest Harbor was requested to provide a beach patrol to prevent photographing and to clear the beach of observers. The Coast Guard was also requested to patrol

Operational Intelligence Report of Mission (Continued)

the southern side of Mt. Desert Island to prevent photographing. The HARRIET LANE was ordered to keep all small craft one mile distant from scene.

At 1102, the YTB327 was ordered to tow wreckage on to the beach. At 1145, the wreckage was secured on the beach while the CG38023 was ordered to take a line from the nose of the wreckage to hold the bag taut.

At 1330, Lieut. Comdr. C. A. Bolam, USN, from South Weymouth, Mass. arrived at scene and relieved Lieut. Comdr. Pear, USNR, as Com-Sur. At 1346, the diver descended and reported as follows:

"Very good bottom. At the forward end of the car now. It is all smashed in. I am under the 50 calibre machine gun mount. The gun is not here, just a lot of 50 calibre shells all strewn around. Car is a mess."

At 1420, diver was hoisted aboard. At 1515, No. 2 diver over side. Found a dog tag stamped "William Munro" and at 1527 observed a body in the cabin in a white uniform. A retrieving line and shackle were sent down via his air line in an attempt to open the starboard door which was unsuccessful. At 1554, diver was hoisted aboard. Divers did not advise further salvage operations due to the fact that the overhanging folds of the bag made it dangerous as they were in contact with the air lines as they were in constant motion. They could not enter the car because of the narrowness of the entrances and the width of their diving equipment. At 1707 secured salvage operations for night until Lieut. Comdr. Bolam could confer with all officers relative to a definite plan of salvage. (For salvage plan operations, see Appendix G.)

There have been numerous reports of heavy explosions and gunfire and machine gun fire at or about the time the K-14 crashed which may

have been responsible for the crash. (See Appendix H.)

The following are the survivors from the K-14:

Ensign McDonnel, USNR, Pilot Ensign Levine USNR, Co-Pilot Ensign Sharp, USNR, Co-Pilot Johnson, AMM2c

The bodies of the following have been recovered:

Lieut. Kluber, USNR, Co-Pilot Drezewicki, Rigger Oldar, AMM Powels, RM Ozesky, AEM3c

Operational Intelligence Report of Mission (Continued)

The body of Munro, RM, has not been recovered.

A board of investigation has been convened by Rear Admiral Theobald, USN, Commander, Northern Group, to investigate the circumstances attendant to the crash of the blimp, K-14.

JOHN W. SHYNE, Lieutenant, USNR, Operational Intelligence Officer.

NAVAL SECTION BASE Bar Harbor Maine

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

6 July 1944

- Subject: Report of Explosions Heard July 022100Q to 022300Q, 1944 in General Area Between Southwest Harbor, Corea Harbor, and Mt. Desert Rock.
- Note 1: The following facts should be taken into consideration with the possibility of sighting of enemy submarine by fisherman in area 44° 06' N, 67° 57' W, estimated course (of submarine) 340° T. Time of sighting, July 021045Q.
- Note 2: Possibility that the loss of U.S. Navy Blimp K-14 in area 440 05' N, 670 50' W, which crashed at approximately July 022210Q, 1944 could have been as a result of enemy action.
- nanding officer of APc-94, reported that on July 022130Q, while on a patrol between Schoodic Point Whistle and Petit Manan Island, he and all hands on his ship heard the explosion of two depth charges to seaward of them. This was not reported at the time of hearing nor did he investigate. On July 030855Q, while screening the salvage operations of the blimp, he reported by despatch a large slick of heavy oil, quantities of dead fish, and some debris consisting of plywood in position 44° 10.1' N, 67° 55.3' W (by sextant angles). Lieutenant Hoyt took samples of the oil which is now, presumably, at the Naval Frontier Base, Portland, Maine. Please note that the time of reported explosion of depth charges is about 40 minutes prior to the estimated time of blimp crash.
- 2. Warrant Officer W. Meytrott, USA, officer-in-charge of Army Crash Boat P-103, stationed at Bar Harbor, states that on July O22152Q, 1944, his ship was stationed off Pond Island near Schoodic Point and that he and three men distinctly heard what sounded like six pom-pom shots which he estimates as possibly from a 20 MM gun. He estimates the position of these sounds as coming from the area where the blimp crashed. The blimp was sighted by him on July O22130Q on a course from Schoodic Point to the point of crash. He estimates that considering speed and course of blimp, that blimp must have been in area where sound of gun fire emanated.
- 3. On July 050920Q, (reference 5 July NB82/A16-3/ON22/FHH: ESD) Lieutenant Hovey, USNR, Operational Intelligence Officer, Rockland, Maine, advised that the captain on an O'Hara fishing vessel, "JEANNE

D'ARC" (confidential fisherman observer was in area 16 miles east by south of Mt. Desert Rock on July 022200Q, when he heard engine overhead. He went on deck and saw the blimp which circled around, estimated altitude 75 feet, and headed off on an easterly course. About 10 minutes later he heard two shots which he described to be "three pounders." A few minutes later he heard a muffled explosion similar to a heavy gun or depth charge after which he heard another noise which sounded like a fisherman underway. There was another fishing boat in the area named the COLUMBO (Richard Noonan) as well as an unidentified 95' fishing vessel, green hull, grey bulwarks, yawl rig.

The fishing boat 1J4, operated by Roger Stanley of Southwest Harbor, accompanied by Louis Bishop, also of Southwest Harbor, finished setting a trawl at sunset, (2 July) at a point approximately seven miles easterly of the southerly tip of Schoodic Island on a line projected from Egg Rock Light past the southerly tip of the island. The times given in the statement from Roger Stanley and Louis Bishop are estimated times based upon having waited in the position for an hour or so after setting their trawl. Note that sunset was at 2021Q which would make the times stated by these men 2121Q or later, although in their conversation they placed the time as approximately 10:20 p.m. The joint statement made by these men is approximately as follows: An hour or so after completing the setting of their trawls, they saw flashes which they described as in the nature of flares more or less to the westward of their fishing position. The distance was estimated at over a mile. There were approximately 10 or 12 of these bright flashes which from their position appeared to be about the size of a volley ball. Shortly thereafter, at a point estimated to be three miles south of their fishing position, they saw very bright flashes in rapid succession practically on the water. One of the two men thought he heard reports as of gunfire, but one of the men stated that while he saw the flashes he could not say that he had heard the reports. Immediately following the flashes from the water, they heard two very distinct heavy explosions at approximately the same position to southward of their fishing position. Following the explosions they distinctly felt their fishing boat rise and fall in the water twice. The rise and fall was described as a surge up and down. When asked to set the time of the foregoing explosions more accurately than "an hour or so after completing the setting of the trawl" the men said "10:20 p.m." It should be noted that this time is not actually reported from a clock. They also estimated their position to be from 17 to 20 miles northeast of Mt. Desert Rock. Shortly before the sighting of the flares and flashes was the last time that these men saw the blimp. They caught a glimpse of her in the moonlight over their fishing position. They said that "she was low and at a distinct angle." Her course was described as southerly.

- 5. Frothingham, BMlc, USCGR, stationed at Otter Cliff, located on the southern section of Mt. Desert Island, stated that on 2 July between 2200Q and 2300Q, two of his men on duty and one located at Little Hunter Cove on Mt. Desert Island, heard three explosions, one large and two of lesser intensity, emanating from a direction south by southeast, approximately 10 miles off from Mt. Desert Island. These explosions were heard by the three men. The three men described the explosions as possibly resulting from heavy gunfire. One explosion was of sufficient intensity to shake the weather station structure located at Otter Cliff.
- 6. Mr. Merchant, U.S. Navy civilian guard located at U.S. Navy Radio Station, Winter Harbor, stated that while on duty July 022230Q he heard about five explosions which sounded like depth charges which came from the direction of Mt. Desert Rock.
- 7. Mr. Herbert Jones, postmaster at Corea Harbor, stated that several people in Corea Harbor heard two explosions which sounded like depth charges, but could not give a reliable time estimate nor direction, although the explosions shook the houses in Corea Harbor.
- 8. Mr. Byron Moore of Prospect Harbor states that on July 2, at approximately 2230Q, heavy explosions which sounded like depth charges were heard by several people in Prospect Harbor and the explosions were of sufficient intensity to shake the houses there.
- 9. A survey was made of commanding officer, U.S. Army stationed at Cadillac Mountain, various contacts in Southwest Harbor, McKinley Harbor, Mt. Desert Rock, and Long Island, but no information could be obtained relative either to the explosions, gunfire, flashes, or flares.

COMMENTS:

- l. Upon examination of blimp bag on shore at Southwest Harbor on July 061500Q, it was noted that tail and fins were missing. One of the blimp salvage officers indicated that he could not explain the absence of tail assembly. Complete examination of bag was not possible at time of observation.
 - 2. Four depth charges were not found on wreck.
- 3. Survivors state that they heard or felt no explosion or concussion during period of flight or while in the water.
 - 4. Dead bodies showed no outward evidence of concussion.

3 July 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE SUB-COMMANDER NORTHERN GROUP

From: Senior Duty Officer.

Subj: Report on Crash of the K-14.

- l. Upon receipt of information from Bar Harbor that a fisherman had sighted a submarine 15 miles Southeast by South, from Baker Island, Maine, surface craft available at Bar Harbor and Rockland, and a Coast Guard vessel from Southwest Harbor were ordered to the scene, to search the area.
- 2. The Air Controller requested the assistance of the Brunswick Air Station, and a plane which was in the air on patrol was diverted to the scene also. South Weymouth was directed by the Air Controller to prepare a blimp to take off on short notice. The Sub-Commander Northern Group ordered the blimp to the scene and it departed from South Weymouth at 1701, and an estimated ETA at that time was 2130.
- 3. The plane from Brunswick reported on its return, "Search Negative", and reports from surface craft during the evening were, "Search Negative". Visibility was excellent; sea smooth; light, variable winds.
- 4. The first reports from the fisherman had indicated some doubt as to whether he had actually sighted a submarine. Later amplified reports, however, indicated that it was possible that a submarine had been sighted in a semi-submerged condition.
- 5. The Sub-Commander Northern Group plotted a definite area for the K-14 to search and this was given to the K-14 at 2045. The last contact with the K-14 was at 2120. Frequent efforts were made to contact the K-14 by radio, through surface craft and air bases, by the Air Controller without success. At 0400 the Air Controller reported to the Surface Controller that the K-14 did not respond to calls, and the surface vessels were requested to be on the alert for the blimp and report.
- 6. At 0455 a message was received from Bar Harbor that the PYc47 had picked up four (4) survivors from the K-14 which had crashed at 44-05 North, 67-50 West. The Crash Boat P-103 was immediately dispatched to the scene, together with the APc94, YP600, and the CG-66002, and Commander MOFFAT at Bar Harbor appointed Lieutenant CARSWELL on the PYc-47 as ComSur.
- 7. Rockland was requested to dispatch the YP-547. Portland was requested to prepare the GUMTREE and the tug HAIGLAR for immediate departure, subject to further orders. SOPA Casco was requested to assign the AT KALMIA. The KALMIA was not available, however, and the ATA-173 was ordered by SOPA to depart to the scene of the crash with

- a diver and equipment on board. In addition to the ATA, the DE-171 and the DE-173 were also ordered by SOPA to the scene.
- 8. The Sub-Commander Northern Group directed Lieut-Commander PEAR of Hingham, who is an experienced Lighter-than-Air Officer to proceed to the scene by plane, and he was instructed to take over the duties of ComSur on arrival.
- 9. The first task was to attempt to rescue any living survivors, and second, to have available salvage craft to save the K-14 from total loss, if possible. The K-14 was still afloat and was being tended by the PYc-47, YP-600, APc-94, and the CG-66002. The cause of the crash could not be determined until the personnel saved could be interrogated. However, information was received that the crash was not caused by enemy action. The vessels at the scene were warned that depth charges were attached to the blimp, set at 25 feet, and that care must be used not to dislodge them so that they would become armed.
- 10. The Mine Recovery Officer of the Boston Section was dispatched with his men and equipment to Salem, by truck, where they boarded a PBM to Bar Harbor. The ETA at Bar Harbor of the Mine Recovery Officer was 1138.
- 11. In the meantime Bar Harbor had reported the four (4) survivors had been placed on the Crash Boat P-103 and were en route to the Base. It had been reported that the men were not in serious physical condition, but were suffering from bruises and exposure, and were getting the proper medical attention.
- 12. Lieut-Commander PEAR questioned these survivors on their arrival and a more complete report of the accident was obtained. It was decided to hold the P-103 in Bar Harbor until the arrival of the Mine Recovery Officer, so that he could proceed to the scene of the crash with Lieut-Commander PEAR.
- 13. As the distance was approximately 24 miles it was believed advisable to have these two experienced men on the scene as quickly as possible.
- 14. The GUMTREE (AN18) is expected to arrive on the scene at approximately 1600, and care is being used not to damage the blimp in any way, in order to keep it afloat until larger vessels arrive.

L. C. McEWEN Commander, USNR

BAR HARBOR SECTION BASE

Statements of Rlimp K-14 Survivors Made to Lieutenant Commander John F. Pear, USNR, on July 031000Q, 1944

Ensign McDonnell, USNR:

(Questions by Lieut. Comdr. Pear)

I got out in the water -- I was talking to myself --

Q. Did you have your life-jacket on?

A. Yes, we had out life-jackets on. Johnson had his on but it was ripped off him. I remember yelling at everybody to stick together. I was in a daze.

Ensign Levine, USNR:

Mac was in a dazed condition and I came over--I swam over and then I grabbed Pete (Drezewicki) by the arm. He grabbed my arm and almost twisted it off. The only way I could hold him was to grab his life-jacket with my teeth.

Q. He got out of the car with you?

A. Pete, my rigger. He was vomiting, sick, and I held him up the best I could. He didn't seem to be able to help himself and I was all spent.

Ensign McDonnell, USNR:

I don't know what made me go for the fin. I saw that fin and it looked substantial. We got up on that. Sharp had to swim for it. It was drifting away. He had a hard time catching it. We all got on. Pete, he was vomiting. Whitey we practically had to drag on. He was going—he was hysterical and grabbed at me. I hit him.

Ensign Levine, USNR:

The fin was hard to hang on to and the only way I could hold him was to dig my teeth into his life-jacket. Johnson had his life-jacket ripped off. The last I remember I yelled. The bag seemed to be on top of us.

Johnson, MoMM

I swam to the fin. My life-jacket was ripped and we got up on the fin and when we first hit the water--I hesitate to say what I was thinking. I was afraid the bag would come on top of us. The fin looked inviting. We were on the fin for about 10 minutes when the fin started breaking up.

Ensign McDonnell, USNR:

I told them to keep on the metal part but it kept breaking up and our only chance then was to get on the bag.

Q. You had no trouble keeping afloat or keeping together? A. No, sir. Except Johnson. His life-jacket was ripped.

Johnson, MoMM

It had a rip in it. It caught on something and the bag was pulling me down. The jacket had a rip in it. The air was leaking out. I had a hell of a job making the fin so I was a whipped man when I reached the fin.

Ensign McDonnell, USNR:

The other fellows and poor Pete were on the fin. He was on the ballonade. His life-jacket was inflated.

Q. Well, so nearly as you know, it just flew into the water?

No engine trouble?

A. We were flying at from 250 to 300 feet for experimental reasons -- you have to fly that low to make a good search. That is the only way you can do it.

Q. Good visibility?

A. Good visibility. There wasn't any turbulence at all--just as smooth as glass, but the ship was definitely tail heavy. She was about 1400 pounds heavy. We eased about 150 gallons of fuel.

Q. You were in radio communication with the ships?

A. Yes, we were.

Q. Just shifted over to that frequency?

A. No, I will tell you how that worked out. About 10 minutes past eight we sighted these two vessels—the PATRIOT and the YP-600—so we went over them and blinked to them and told them we were going on such and such a frequency. Then our radioman reported that our radio won't receive anything lower than 2600. So here is the way we worked it. The TWB had to be on the base frequency and to receive he had to use the elevator man's ARB so he hooked it up that way and we worked that special frequency. The rudder man guarded 3000.

Q. You didn't feel any slowing up before you went into the

water?

A. No, sir. When we hit I ran up forward.

Q. What R.P.M. were you making?

A. 1200. I had to save as much fuel as possible so we kept it at 1200. We had a five or six knot wind so our speed was as good as ground speed. When we hit I didn't have time to do anything. I yelled to the crew to get out. At a time like that you just act on instinct. You have strange thoughts. You don't believe it. I remember saying to myself, "Oh, my God, this is it. I am going to die" and things like that. You just yell. When I hit the water, there was no question of helping anybody else. It was just a case of trying to get clear without looking for anybody else to help.

Q. How many people did you see in the water -- just these men

here?

A. Plus my rigger.

Q. How do you feel now? A. Weak, that is all.

- How do you feel, Mike (Levine)?
- A. All right. Q. Johnson?

A

Yes, sir, I am all right. Any cuts, bruises, or anything? Just my eye. I had my glasses on.

0. Any cuts or bruises. Sharp?

I am all right, sir. A

The water was cold but you were so excited you didn't feel it?

That is about it.

Ensign Levine, USNR:

Q. Where were you, Mike, when it hit?

- A. I was in the port sack. That is, I had only just come off watch. I was lying down but I wasn't asleep. That is the only thing that saved me. I had just come off the elevator watch -- slipped by Mac-he was at the radar. I told Mac to tell Sharp that I would be in the sack and he could call me when he needed me. I turned over facing the bunk's head. I was on the starboard side. I turned over. This is the life, I was thinking, nice and warm, and just as I settled down there was a bump and a jar and I said, "God damn it." I was lying right next to the canvas strip. I felt a jar and threw my fist out and pushed right through the canvas. Then, first thing I knew we were in the water.
- Q. You pushed your fist right through the side of the ship? That canvas strip over the bunk, I pushed my way through keeping clear of the props. I looked around for the rest and by that time the bag had settled down. I kept bobbing up and down under it-- I couldn't seem to get clear. I was fighting for air and all I got was water. I didn't have my life-jacket inflated. The only reason I am here is that in bobbing up and down I fell into a pocket of air underneath the bag. I knew I had to conserve my strength so I remember telling myself to breathe deeply--breathe in deep, breathe in deep. I kept sucking in air until I saw I had enough strength and I saw a streak of light. I dove under and headed for it. I used my knife to cut myself free and when I came on the surface there was Mac. I saw a figure and I helloed. We asked who it was and Mac answered and I swam over. He was in a dazed condition. He told me to stick together. Next I saw a head come out of the water. It was Johnson. He was struggling to keep afloat. He was hung up on his life-jacket. He asked me to give him a hand. I pulled and yanked and he came out of it. We pulled him over and realized that he didn't have a lifejacket. He said it pulled off. I yelled to Mac realizing we'd have to hold him. He called for all hands to come together. We heard a voice. Sharp was on the aft end of the ship trying to make knots and the ship was drifting away. Actually -- I think the others will agree with me -- we were on the two tail fins. They were on top of each other.

They looked flat and high and dry so we made for that and Drezewicki popped up. He yelled and came up to us. He was all in. He was--I don't know how you would say it -- he was mumbling to himself. We were all together and headed for the fin. We got on there. Johnson had no strength left and we had a job getting him on top of the fin. were just about fagged out. He was without a life-jacket. Drezewicki was near the fin and I reached for him. He grabbed my arm and almost twisted it out of the socket. I said to him, "Help yourself, Pete." I was beat myself. I couldn't give him too much help. I grabbed his life-jacket with my teeth. We heaved and shoved and got Pete aboard. He seemed unable to help himself. When the fin went under we hopped to another fin. Then we went for the bag. It didn't seem to have any substance. It kept giving away under us. Mac said make for a higher fabric. We swam for it. Drezewicki--he was floating in his life-jacket. He was laying on top of the fin and he said come for me or stay with me or something. We were all in. Then we just made a hard piece of fabric and I remember my reaction -- my leg muscles. my shanks, were shivering. I just couldn't do anything. I couldn't control my muscles. My stomach was twisted and I was having a little bit. There we lay and we saw Pete was resting on the fin and it was going. The horrible part of it was that there was nothing we could do -- there was no way for me to get to him. If I had gone for him, there would have been the two of us. He went out facing me. I just can't seem to describe it. We were just spent, waiting to gather strength. He called for his father or something and that was all-two groans and Drezewicki was gone. All we could do was stand by and try to feel for a higher fabric -- eased up on it and held on till the ship came and got us.

Q. What time did the ship pick you up?

A. I remember I had the only watch that was working -- it was 15 after 5.

Q. You stayed on the fin?

A. No, we were on the fabric -- lying in the water. We heard engines around us -- they were running a box patrol they told us later -- and we all got together and yelled and no one answered. We got together and yelled and played games about what time it was. That is the only thing that kept us going.

Q. What time was it when they picked you up?

A. It was 10 after five or 15 after five. They took us aboard, gave us clothing, coffee, cigarettes, and put us to bed and the rest you know. I just can't seem to think of anything else now.

Ensign Sharp, USNR:

Q. How are you feeling, Sharp? Want to tell me your story?
A. I had been on the flight panel control and Johnson relieved
me. I got into the bunk just a few minutes. I didn't feel tired or
sleepy so I went forward and asked Mac if he wanted relief. He said

not just at that time so I sat in the forward lookout post for about five minutes and then Mac asked if I wanted to take over, so I did. The ship had been flying beautifully. I had been up with her several times before. We were flying about 250 feet. I reached up to dim the ultra-violet lights. They were pretty bright. I sat down again and saw that the indicator was at about 200 feet. I gave it the throttle and the nose came up a little. I put my hand on the throttle to give it more gas -- I don't know whether I advanced it or not but the first thing I knew she was going in. I hollered it was going in. Mac was on the rudder. He got up and went aft. When it actually hit I was wearing ear phones. I started aft but they held me. I was just aft of the bunk head when the ear phones took hold. I started back forward to release them. By that time we were in the water.

Q. Where was Mac?

A. Forward between the power compartments. I went back in through there, got rid of the ear phones, then remembered the rudderman's window was open and headed for that. I got tangled with the radar lines but finally got out through. Q. Which side was that?

A. Rudderman's side. I think we were fairly deep in the water by then. It seemed I had not inflated my jacket. I got out from under and the ship seemed a long way away from me. I could hear a voice over there. I hollered to them to let them know I was there and asked who was there. They told me. All I got was Mac. He did all the rest. I couldn't understand and started swimming toward the bag. I finally got there. I was just about up on the fin there before the fin went under. I went to the bag with the rest of them. I laid on top of it. the fabric, crawled over to the part that was out of the water -- I found about two feet of it on top of the car that seemed above water. I sat on that.

Q. Engines didn't fail till you hit the water?

- I can't understand it. She started to answer the up-elevator all right. I couldn't believe it was going in. Not until we were just about to hit.
 - Q. All the time you say you were flying at about 200 feet?

Just a little better -- about 250.

- You don't remember what the rate of climb was at that time? Pretty fast rate?
- A. No. sir, I don't. After it started to answer the up-elevator I couldn't feel any motion at all.
 - You think the trips acted normally to the up-elevator?

Yes, sir.

- What part of the ship hit the water first? Q.
- I believe the tail hit the water first. Was the ship nose heavy or tail heavy? Q.

Tail heavy. Carried forward five degrees.

Your story is the same -- tried to stick together until the PATRIOT picked you up?

A. Yes, sir.

Statements of Blimp K-14 Survivors (Continued)

Q. Did you see anyone in the water besides these men and Drezewicki?

A. No, sir.

Johnson, MoMM

Q. Where were you when it crashed?

- A. I was on the mec panel. I was just going to leave to get a cup of hot water to make some chocolate. I was just going to-I hadn't left my seat at the panel when I heard the thing hit. I didn't know what happened. Someone yelled to pull the life raft. I turned around to pull the trips on it and pulled two or three trips when something hit me. I was wearing no life-jacket so I reached up for it and by that time I was in the water. I got a big mouthful-gave a jump and went up to the side and took another breath. Soon the whole car was flooded with water.
 - Q. After the ship hit, it didn't knock you out?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you see anyone release the life raft?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you remember who was in the aft part of the car?

A. I remember who was there, but I didn't see them.

Ensign Sharp, USNR:

I can give you the location of everyone of the crew.

Q. We'll come back to you later then.

Johnson, MoMM

A. Ed was there.

Q. But you didn't see him?

A. No, sir.

Ensign Sharp, USNR:

Q. You had seven men aboard?

A. Six men. I didn't take Gramer the other rigger. It isn't my policy to take two riggers on a trip like this.

Q. Then Gramer is out. You don't think the life raft went out, do you?

A. Some fellow on the PATRIOT said they had picked it up. They must have released it.

Q. Somebody did go for it then?

Johnson, MoMM

Q. How did you get out?

- A. I don't know. When we hit I was so excited -- I thought of my wife, naturally, and thought, "My God, this must be it." I couldn't believe it. The fellows went down. I started back up. I was pushing my way up and the first thing I knew I saw light.
 - Q. You don't remember how you got out of the car?
- A. No, sir, I don't remember at all. I remember seeing Mr. Levine caught on something. He grabbed hold of me, gave a big lunge, and broke free. He told you everything else. All the rest I verify. Everything he said. We climed on that tail and tried to keep warm. I had on a pair of shoes and my feet got so cold I couldn't wiggle my toes. I kept my feet as dry as possible. It seemed like every joint in my body was aching.
 - Q. Pretty cold?
- A. I was shivering all over. It seemed my bones right in by my crotch were awful sore. You know the rest of it.

Ensign Sharp, USNR:

Ozesky was in the after lookout. Mr. MacDonald was at the radar, Paul was at the forward lookout-he came aft just as I went forward. I think he and the other radioman were at the radio. Lieutenant Kluber was at the navigator's table. (Munro was the radio man.)

- Q. Anybody know where the other mec was?
- A. He was in the big leather chair on the starboard side.
- Q. I guess that is all for now. Just take it easy and try to get some rest.

NAVAL SECTION BASE Bar Harbor Maine

Report on Salvage Operations of K-14 at Little Cranberry Island, Maine, on July 5, 6, 7, 1944, as observed by Comdr. A. W. Moffat, USNR, Commanding Officer, Bar Harbor Section, Bar Harbor, Maine.

- l. On July 5 at 0700 Q with Lt. Comdr. Bolam, USN, ComBlimpRon 11, ComSur and technical experts from NAS South Weymouth and Lakehurst, I embarked from Bar Harbor Section Base for the scene, anchoring in the vicinity of the vessels ordered for salvage at 0745 Q.
- 2. The GUMTREE, KICKAPOO, and HAIGLAR were anchored in the vicinity of the wreck. Weather: fog patches, sea calm, wind 2 from S.E.. The wreck was on mud in 40' of water in the cove east of Bunker Neck on the north side of Little Cranberry Island with the YP600 alongside. Lt. Comdr. John Pear, USNR, was aboard the YP600. He had been Comsuruntil Lt. Comdr. Bolam's arrival July 4. Lieut.(jg) Jamison, Mine Disposal Officer, with tow divers were also aboard YP600.
- 3. Lt. Comdr. Bolam proceeded to the YP600 and relieved Lt. Comdr. Pear. The report received from the diver who had completed one dive was that the car was 95% wrecked. He had seen one body, in the car and had found Munroe's dog tag hanging on the outside of the front of the car by the broken chain. The forward end of the bag was approximately 10' above the surface. The car with the remainder of the bag draped over it was on bottom. The diver reported that the tide swirled the bag in folds, enveloping him from time to time and only occasionally revealing the side of the car which lay on its starboard side with the motor in the mud. Comsur concurred that the diving conditions were too hazardous to be continued at the time.
- 4. The GUMTREE was ordered to approach the wreck. Lt. Waugh, Commanding Officer, was directed to carry out his suggestion for method of salvage which showed good seamanship and which proved successful. The GUMTREE was placed with horns over the inflated portion of the bag steaming slowly against the strain of a stern anchor. The HAIGLAR was placed on the starboard side to hold the GUMTREE into the wind as necessary. The motor life boat from Cranberry Island Station held a strain on the line attached to the nose of the bag to keep it up wind and to haul it as much as possible clear of the car. Lt. Waugh directed operations from the horn platform, handling the winches by battle phone.
- 5. The GUMTREE's launch floated the end of a 3" line around the bag. The end was then brought aboard and secured to a heavy shackle on the standing part, forming a running noose. Heavy shackles were placed on the floating noose to sink it as far as possible. The line was then hauled in, pinching off the bag beneath the surface and bringing the noosed part of the bag, forward of the car to the level of the

GUMTREE's deck. This operation raised the car until it was visible from the deck. It had turned over so that the remaining motor and propeller were on top. The strain on the 3" line was considered too great to shift it to the horn, so hoisting operations were belayed until a new 8" line could be similarly rigged from the port horn. This noose was finally tightened somewhat below the 3" noose. When hoisting operations were resumed the car was raised until a wire could be passed around the motor and struts from the launch. The next hoist brought the hub of the propeller to the surface where a wire strop was attached. The body of Lt. Kluber was visible in the window adjacent to the radio desk. Another body in whites was visible forward. The bodies of Older, Lt. Kluber, and Powell were removed by the GUMTREE's running boat.

- 6. The KICKAPOO had been placed on the port side of the GUMTREE to hold the vessels in position by her port anchor, clear if possible of the bag. The ILEX towing a barge from Portland was reported en route from Portland ETA 2300.
- 7. It was proposed to place the car on the barge after cutting away the bag. This work proceeded until dark while the PATRIOT, which had been screening the operation, returned to Bar Harbor with the three bodies, for trans-shipment by PBM to Salem. I returned with bodies to Bar Harbor. On departure of Lt. Comdr. Bolam from scene, for Southwest Harbor, Lt. Waugh became ComSur.
- 8. By morning of July 6, the bag had been cut away and towed to the Coast Guard Base at Southwest Harbor by the HAIGLAR for hauling on the dock for examination. The ILEX had remained alongside the barge placed on the port side of the GUMTREE. A despatch reported that a mishap had occurred in attempting to lift the car to the deck of the ILEX. I proceeded to Southwest Harbor with Lt. Comdr. Bolam at 0900 to view the salvage of the bag, and then proceeded via CG-66002 to the scene with some additional timbers which had been requested.
- 9. On arrival at scene it was found that the KICKAPOO had been released and was starting for Southwest Harbor. The GUMTREE was on the starboard side of the barge, the ILEX was on the port side. The ILEX was holding the car awash in the water rigged for hoisting. A 12" x 12" strongback the length of the car was supporting a number of 4" x 4" cross members from which the car was suspended at suspension points. The two of the after cross members had broken in lifting, so the car had been lowered until cross members at least 6" x 6" could be rigged. By measurements it had been ascertained that the boom on the GUMTREE could not lift sufficient height to place the car on her own deck, nor did the ILEX have sufficient height to lift the car clear of the rail of the barge, although the ILEX, by topping up, could lift the car to its own deck with about 3" to spare. (Both vessels

had enough power for the lift). Accordingly the strain on the car had been transferred from the GUMTREE to the ILEX previous to my arrival for the lift which had proved unsuccessful.

- 10. I returned to Southwest Harbor to arrange orders for KICK-APOO and to despatch HAIGLAR with the barge to Portland. The ILEX was directed to proceed to Southwest Harbor when the car was aboard and there await inspection by the Board. The ILEX arrived at Southwest Harbor and the bag was on the deck.
- ll. On July 7 I proceeded with the Board to Southwest Harbor for inspection of the wreckage. I ordered the ILEX to proceed to Portland with all wreckage when directed by the Senior Member of the Board. She departed at 1602 Q via Rockland, ETA Portland 1330 Q July 8, where the trailer from South Weymouth had been ordered to take off the wreckage. Lt. G.B. Southward from BlimpRon 11 made the passage aboard the ILEX in charge of the wreckage, assisted by Chief Machinist O'Neill from South Weymouth.
- 12. Following is a description of the condition of the car when examined on July 7 on the deck of the ILEX:
- A. Bag was examined and about 15 to 20 small holes were found in the under part of bag aft of the car which could have been caused by bullets. These are to be tested by Board of Investigation for gun powder.
- B. Forward observation window smashed. Starboard motor secured. Port engine was taken off during salvage attempts.

C. Car considered to be in excellent condition considering

crash and length of time submerged.

D. No additional bodies found in car or bag, but previously Lt. Kluber's body was found in seat on starboard side in front of radio equipment. Oldar's body was found in compartment aft of the machine gun compartment. Powell's body was lying inside starboard door between radio equipment and forward compartment.

E. Safety bar was in position across starboard door, but door

was locked on slip bolt.

- F. The two depth charges which had been on board were missing. Bomb releases were on unarmed position in cabin. All bomb levers in unreleased position. Finding of depth charge arming wires on both sides indicates that when bombs tore loose the bombs were armed at 50 feet.
 - G. Instrument readings not considered reliable.
 Rate of descent 425' per minute.
 Altimeter all off.
 Mechanical guage which registers pressure showed
 .94 inches of water. Normally carries 1" to 1½".
 Engine RPM read zero.
 Air Speed 70 mph.

Forward clock 2239.05 Q.
Radioman clock 1642 GCT.
Super heat meter: temperature of gas as compared with outside temperature +3° C.
Elevator indicator in "off" position.
Compass readings (all differ)
Directional Gyro Compass150°
Remote indicating compass reads 70° M

Radio frequencies

Rudderman's: voice 3000 kcs
Elevatorman's: voice about 2195 kcs
(reading can be 40 kcs error due to long wires).
Main radio: just under 3500 kcs.

IFF equipment on "off" position.

Forward throttles bent across one another at not over 1000 RPM position. (estimated by Lt. Comdr. Bolam.)

Running lights on "off".

Port engine read 172° F. Starboard engine read 100° F.

Radar Hat (plywood) gone.

#7 gas tank bashed in when car surfaced.

12 July 1944.

From: Officer-in-Charge, Mine Disposal Unit, FIRST Naval District.

To: Sub-Commander, Northern Group.

Via: Commander, Local Defense Force, Northern Group.

Subj: Activities of the Mine Disposal Unit - FIRST Naval District relative to Salvage of U.S. Navy Blimp K-14 - Report of.

1. Herewith is submitted a report of the Mine Disposal Unit, FIRST Naval District from 3 July to 7 July 1944, in connection with the operations of the U.S. Navy Blimp K-14.

(A) July 3 - At 0730 the Unit was ordered via air transportation from the Salem Air Station to Bar Harbor, Maine. The Mine Disposal Officer, two (2) men and full diving gear were loaded onto the PBM (Mariner), left Salem, Massachusetts at 1000 arrived at Bar Harbor at 1130. The Unit reported immediately to Commander Moffat, Bar Harbor Section Base, and to Lieutenant Commander J. Pear, Com. Sur. from the Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts. At 1430 the Unit arrived upon the scene of operations via the P-103 and all diving gear was loaded on the YP-600 designated by Commander Moffat as the diving boat for the operations. During the conference the duties of the Mine Disposal Unit were to be as follows:

(1) To search for unexploded depth bombs by diving, (2) To determine whether or not bodies could be removed by divers, (3) To determine the condition of the wreckage as an aid to the salvage

vessels.

The following facts were noted by this officer when viewing the wreckage. The position of the wreck was in approximately 44-4'N, 67-58'W. The bag was about one half inflated forward, the stern end covering the gondola which was submerged about twenty (20) feet below with one-quarter (1/4) of the stern above water. The port gas tanks made for the buoyancy. Attempts then were made to raise the car out of the water with the aid of the USCG KICKAPOO which failed resulting in tearing of the port engine off the out rigging. While out of the water no bombs could be seen on the port side, as the gondola lay starboard to about 50° in the water. A number four (4) swell hampered operations to such a degree that the main after suspension joints were torn off. It was then decided that the ATA-173 tow the balloon to Bunker Head Neck off Cranberry Island near Southwest Harbor in order to rest the gondola in about forty (40) feet of water so that divers could work on the wreckage. Two (2) bodies had been removed prior to the arrival of Com. Sur. and party.

(B) July 4 - From 0830 to 1350 the operations consisted chiefly of keeping the bag away from the wreck using a Coast Guard launch. The YP-600 was anchored about twenty (20) yards from the wreckage and prepared for diving. Lieutenant Commander Boland from the Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts arrived on the scene as Com. Sur. The wreck was on the bottom in six and one-half

(6克) fathoms of water at the time of the first dive.

Subj: Activities of the Mine Disposal Unit - FIRST Naval District relative to Salvage of U.S. Navy Blimp K-14 - Report of.

Before diving, a complete sketch of the gondola was made by Lieutenant Commander Boland and his aides for the divers. From 1330 to 1630, HULL, R. F., MMlc and BROOKS, W., (n), MNlc, made the dives with the Mine Disposal Officer as diving officer. The results of the diving showed the following facts: One or more bodies just forward of the starboard emergency door. The divers could not remove the bodies because of the impossibility of opening the emergency door. Furthermore, the shrouds of the bag were engulfing the car as more deflation occurred such that maneuverability became too hazardous.

No bombs were visible to the divers. The condition of the compartment itself was not too bad except for the torn away upper plate glass of the forward compartment. The lower forward section was torn away with the top after section torn away also. The gun tower was open. A dog tag was found suspended on a piece of glass and was reported to Com. Sur. There was no way for the divers to work their way inside the gondola without fouling, as the hatchway was too narrow. The temperature of the water was between 420 - 440.

It was then decided that operations secure for the day. Com. Sur. and party returned to Bar Harbor for a conference. The Mine Disposal Unit was ordered to standby all night aboard the YP-600 in

the event of further diving.

(C) July 5 - Another dive was made in the morning to reach the gondola to remove the bodies, but by this time the gondola was nearly covered by the balloon shrouds so that the diver could not enter too far under the shrouds without fouling. The diving was ordered secured.

The rest of the day was spent in cutting away the balloon suspension wires to free the gondola for hoisting. The balloon was towed to Southwest Harbor, Maine. The An-18 (SS GUMTREE) raised the car from out of the water to remove three (3) more bodies. One (1) body could not be found (one whose name was on dog tag). This body is believed to have been lost in towing. A towing barge was to arrive 2300 that night to haul the car on deck. Divers stood by all day till 2130 in the event the car broke from lines and should sink to the bottom. Three (3) civilian divers were on hand from 1430 to work in the event of continuous diving necessitating relief for the Mine Disposal Divers. No further diving was necessary and the three (3) civilian divers were sent back to the Navy Yard, Com One at 1430, July 6.

(D) July 6 - 7. The Mine Disposal truck was sent up to take gear back to East Boston. It left at 0900 July 7 and arrived at 1830 at Pier #1, East Boston. Commander Moffat ordered the Mine Disposal Officer and men to return to Boston via PBM (Mariner) which left for

Salem at 1600, arriving there at 1730.

(E) The ships present during the operations were:

ATA-173 AN-18 (USS GUMTREE) YTB-327 PYc-47 (USS PATRIOT) Subj: Activities of the Mine Disposal Unit - FIRST Naval District relative to Salvage of U.S. Navy Blimp K-14 - Report of.

P-103
DE-173 and Screening Division of DE's PC-141 (USS HARRIET LANE)
K-25 and K-34
USCG KICKAPOO
USCG 66002
USCG 36395
USCG 32803
YP-600

(F) The Officer-in-Charge of Salvage Operations was Lieutenant Commander C. A. Boland, (N.A.S., South Weymouth, Massachusetts) Com. Sur. as of 1400, 4 July relieving Lieutenant Commander J. Pear (N.A.S., South Weymouth, Massachusetts). Other officers under Com. Sur. were Lieutenant (jg) P. Doyle, Lieutenant (jg) A.T. Blainey, and Chief Machinist C.E. O'Neal - (all from N.A.S., South Weymouth, Massachusetts). Lieutenant R.H. Ward and Lieutenant (jg) D.F. Patzig both from Lakehurst N.J.

(G) No offhand explanation could be given for the failure to find two (2) known depth charges in the after racks and no accounting was given for the dead fish in the area of the crash. A last minute jettisoning of charges may have passed unnoticed, but no substantiation of this belief could be made at that time. The Investigating Committee is working to determine the causes of the accident.

2. Gratitude is expressed at this time for the assistance given the Mine Disposal Unit by Com. Sur., his aides, Commander Moffat and his associates in availing the YP-600 for diving operations.

P.G. JAMESON Lieut. (jg) USNR